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Curry et al.: Updates from the Regional Human Rights Systems

UPDATES FROM THE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
AFRICA
THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
originated with the founding of the
Organization of African States (OAU) in
1963. In July 2001, 53 African heads of state
ratified the African Union (AU)
Constitutive Act, replacing the OAU with
the AU. The AU has dominion over three
mechanisms responsible for enforcing
human rights treaties adopted by member
states. The African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, entered into force in 1986,
established the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights. This commission is responsible for hearing cases brought
against state parties to the treaty. The African
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the
Child, entered into force in 1999, created the
African Committee on the Rights and the
Welfare of the Child to enforce compliance
with that treaty. Finally, the Protocol on the
Establishment of an African Court on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, entered into
force in January 2004, established a court for
the enforcement of the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights. At the time of
publication, the African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights was not yet operational
(see below). Other treaties governing human
rights issues in Africa are the Convention on
Specific Aspects of the Refugee problem in
Africa, entered into force in 1974, and the
Protocol on the Rights of Women, currently
under consideration.

AFRICAN COMMISSION ON
AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS

HUMAN

The 35th Ordinary Session (Session) of
the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (Commission) took place in
Banjul, the Gambia, from May 21 to June 4,
2004. Sudan, Burkina Faso, and Niger each
submitted reports to the Commission detailing the human rights situations in their
respective countries, but as of this writing the
details of the reports had not been published.
The Commissioners passed five resolutions during the Session. Three focused on
specific human rights conditions across the
African Continent (Continent). The

Commission passed a resolution deploring
the killing of dozens of civilians during the
March opposition rallies in Cote d’Ivoire’s
largest city, Abidjan, and set to undertake a
fact-finding mission to investigate other
human rights violations in the country. A
resolution on the conditions in Sudan
deplored the “ongoing gross human rights
violations” in the Darfur region and resolved
to send a fact-finding mission to the area to
investigate. A third resolution, citing deep
concern over the ethnic and religious violence in Northern Nigeria in May 2004,
urged the Nigerian government to bring
perpetrators of human rights violations to
justice and to compensate victims and their
families. The Commissioners also decided to
send a fact-finding mission to investigate
alleged human rights violations in the northern part of the country. (For more on the situation in Nigeria, see page 18.)
In addition, the Commission passed a
resolution urging member states to ratify the
Protocol to the African Charter on the
Rights of Women in Africa (Protocol). As of
August 2004, only four countries—the
Comoros, Libya, Namibia, and Rwanda—
had ratified the Protocol. The Protocol is
designed to go into effect 30 days after the
15th country deposits its ratification with
the African Union.
During the Session, the Commission also
created the post of Special Rapporteur on
Human Rights Defenders in Africa and
named Commissioner Jainaba Johm as the
first person to hold that post. The
Commission noted its deep concern over the
impunity for threats, attacks, and acts of
intimidation against human rights defenders
across the Continent and called on all member states to protect them. Each State must
now detail the measures taken to protect
human rights defenders in their periodic
reports to the Commission.
The 36th Ordinary Session of the
African Commission is scheduled to be held
in Dakar, Senegal, from November 23 to
December 7, 2004. Among the issues delegates plan to discuss is a critical report on the
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human rights situation in Zimbabwe.
Commissioner Johm wrote the report following her fact-finding mission to the country in June 2002.

AFRICAN UNION
During its 3rd Ordinary Session from
July 6 to 8, 2004, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
the African Union (AU) took action to clarify the African Continent’s (Continent)
human rights judicial system.
Following a proposal by Libya, the AU
adopted Decision 45, which states that the
African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights (ACHPR) and the AU Court of
Justice should be integrated into a single
court. The ACHPR was created in January
2004. The Court of Justice, established by
Article 18 of the African Union’s
Constitutive Act in 2001, stated nothing
about the Court’s mandate, but called for a
subsequent protocol to outline its function.
That protocol has not been written. With
the establishment of the ACHPR, human
rights groups and governments were having
difficulty distinguishing between the courts
functions, which seemed to overlap.
In accordance with the Protocol that
established the ACHPR, the AU accepted
nominations for judges to the ACHPR during the 3rd Ordinary Session. The AU invited any State that ratified the Protocol prior
to the session to submit nominations. As of
this writing, the date for the election of the
judges had not been announced.

KENYA
On September 2, 2004, the Kenyan
High Court granted a Nairobi woman the
right to proceed with an HIV discrimination
case. It is the first case of its kind in Kenya.
Justice Mary Mugo announced that she was
allowing the case to go forward because of
the universality of HIV/AIDS and the relevance of the issue for the people of Kenya.
The plaintiff, identified only as JAO,
alleges she was fired from her job as a waitress in 2002 after a doctor revealed to her
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employer that she was HIV-positive. The
woman claims that the hospital where the
doctor worked tested her without her consent. She is suing to get her job back and is
seeking damages from her former employer,
the doctor, and the hospital.
All defendants have denied the claims
and asked the judge to dismiss the case.
Attorneys for the former employer claim
that the employer did not know about the
woman’s HIV status and that she was fired
for her repeated absences.

RWANDA
The Rwandan government has asked
the country’s chief prosecutor to investigate
several NGOs accused of promoting “genocidal ideology and ethnic division.” The
request followed the Rwandan Parliament’s
acceptance in June of a parliamentary commission report prompted by the murder of
several genocide survivors. The commission
report cited several civil society organizations, schools, and churches that officials
suspected of undermining the Gacaca judicial system—the traditional court system
set up to prosecute alleged perpetrators of
the genocide. Among the organizations targeted by the report is the country’s most
prominent human rights organization, the
Rwandese League for the Promotion and
Defense of Human Rights. If the Attorney
General determines that the charges against
any of the organizations are credible, the
government can ban the organizations and
prosecute their personnel. Under Rwandan
law, advocating ethnic differences is a crime
punishable by up to 20 years in prison.
Human rights organizations claim that
some Rwandan officials are manipulating
the memory of the genocide in an attempt to
quiet government criticism. Human Rights
Watch says that Rwandan officials are interpreting the law too broadly, enabling them
to label any opposition to the government as
a promotion of ethnic division. The
European Union has also expressed concern
that the allegations cited in the parliamentary commission report are “insufficiently
substantiated.”

ZIMBABWE
Zimbabwean and international human
rights groups are strongly criticizing a bill

aimed at restricting NGO operations. The
new bill, which is scheduled for vote in the
Zimbabwean Parliament in October, is
widely expected to pass. The proposed bill
forbids Zimbabwean NGOs from accepting
donations from foreign organizations that
work on governance and human rights
issues, including public education about
anti-corruption issues, transparency, and
accountability. The bill would also set up a
panel responsible for registering and vetting
Zimbabwean NGOs. Critics say it is an
attempt by President Robert Mugabe—who
has long accused NGOs of interfering in
Zimbabwe’s politics—to quash criticism of
his regime ahead of next year’s elections. The
government says the bill is necessary for
national security reasons.

EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
THE EUROPEAN COURT of Human Rights
(Court) was established in 1959 by the
European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(European Convention). Enforcing the obligations entered into by the Council of Europe’s
Contracting States, the Court is composed of
the number of judges equal to that of the
Contracting States. Any Contracting State or
individual claiming to be a victim of a violation of the Convention may lodge a complaint
with the Court. In its decisions, the Court
takes into account the various legal systems of
the Contracting States.

LEYLA Ş AHIN V. TURKEY
On June 29, 2004, the Court, seated in
Strasbourg, France, delivered its judgment in
the case of Leyla Ş ahin v. Turkey (Application
No. 44774/98). In a unanimous decision, the
Court rejected appeals by a Turkish student
who was barred from attending Istanbul
University Medical School because her headscarf violated the official university dress code.
The Court held that principles of secularism
and equality underlie the regulations imposing
the restriction on the wearing of the Islamic
headscarves and that the “pressing social need”
to protect the rights and freedoms of students
who do not wear headscarves justifies the
measures. Thus, the Court concluded that the
regulations did not violate Ms. Şahin’s rights
and freedoms under Article 9 of the European
Convention, which guarantees the right to
freedom of religion, in particular, the right to
27

manifest one’s religion. Additionally, the Court
considered the historical, political, and social
context present in Turkey, concluding that the
ban on Islamic headscarves was a valid way to
take a stance against extremist political movements which “seek to impose on society as a
whole their religious symbols and conception
of a society founded on religious precepts.”
On July 21, 1998, Ms. Leyla Şahin, a
Turkish national, filed a case against the
Republic of Turkey with the European
Commission
of
Human
Rights
(Commission) under former Article 25 of
the European Convention. The case was
then transferred to the Court after the adoption of Protocol 11, which amended Article
25 to allow individual complaints and provided for compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court for all States Parties. She alleged that
a ban on wearing Islamic headscarf in higher-education institutions violated her rights
and freedoms under Articles 8 (right to privacy), 9 (freedom of thought, conscience
and religion), 10 (freedom of expression),
and 14 (prohibition of discrimination based
on, inter alia, sex and religion) of the
European Convention, and Article 2 of
Protocol No. 1 (the right to education . . . in
conformity with one’s own religious convictions).
Ms. Şahin, a Turkish student born in
1973, wears the Islamic headscarf because
she regards it as her religious duty and
because she comes from a traditional and
practicing Muslim family. She studied medicine at the University of Bursa, where she
wore her headscarf during the four years of
her studies. In 1997, she enrolled in her fifth
year at the Cerrahpasa Faculty of Medicine
at the University of Istanbul and continued
to wear her headscarf.
On February 23, 1998, the ViceChancellor of Istanbul University issued a
public proclamation of policy (circular)
regarding students’ admission to the campus. The circular mandated that students
with head coverings and students with
beards must not be admitted to lectures,
courses, or tutorials. If a student refused to
comply with these measures, the University
would be compelled to take urgent disciplinary measures. Consequently, because Ms.
Şahin wore a headscarf, the University
denied her access to two written examinations, rejected her registration for a course,
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and refused to admit her to a lecture. The
University labeled Ms. Şahin’s behavior as
“not befitting of a student,” and the dean of
the faculty issued her a warning.
In July 1998, Ms. Şahin filed an application with the Istanbul Administrative court,
seeking an order to set aside the circular. The
Court dismissed her application in March
1999, ruling that both the regulation at issue
and the individual measures taken were
legal. In April 2001, the Turkey’s Supreme
Administrative Court dismissed her appeal.
After her participation in a protest against
the ban on headscarves, University officials
suspended Ms. Şahin for a semester. The
Istanbul Administrative Court subsequently
refused to quash the suspension, stating that
the University’s actions could not be regarded as illegal in light of the material in the case
file and the settled case law on the subject. In
1999, Ms. Şahin left Istanbul to continue her
education at the Faculty of Medicine at
Vienna
University.
The
Supreme
Administrative Court decided not to examine the merits of her appeal in light of a law
promulgated in 2000 that granted amnesty
for disciplinary offenses and annulled any
resulting penalties or disabilities.
In Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, the Court found
that two principles, secularism and equality,
which complement and reinforce each other,
justified banning the wearing of the Islamic
headscarf in Turkey. The Court began its
analysis by stating that “in democratic societies, in which several religions coexist within one and the same population, it may be
necessary to place restrictions on freedom to
manifest one’s religion or belief in order to
reconcile the interests of the various groups
and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected” (citing Kokkinakis v. Greece). The Court
also cited its previous decisions in
Karaduman v. Turkey and Dahlab v.
Switzerland, where it found that the State
may validly restrict wearing of Islamic headscarves if they conflict with the State’s obligation to protect public order, public safety,
and the rights and freedoms of others in the
society.
The Court accepted that upholding the
fundamental principle of secularism in the
State of Turkey may be regarded as necessary
for the protection of the democratic system. It
further found that restrictions on manifesta-

tions of a particular religion are fully justified
under Article 9, Section 2 of the European
Convention, if the restrictions will ensure
peaceful co-existence and will protect public
order and the beliefs of other students.
The Court reaffirmed the notion that
national authorities are, in principle, more
suitable than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions. It further
stated that it can review the legitimacy of
local authorities’ actions under the European
Convention only after granting these authorities a “margin of appreciation” or deference.
The Court emphasized that this is especially
true in the context of the relationship
between state and religion, and in the sphere
of education. Despite these remarks, the
Court retained supervision to ensure that the
regulation does not counter the principle of
pluralism, conflict with other rights in the
European Convention, or entirely negate the
freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs.
The Court maintained that gender
equality is a principle implicit in the values
underlying the Constitution of Turkey and
is also one of the key principles of the
European Convention, as well as a goal to be
achieved by the member States of the
Council of Europe. Consequently, it concluded that wearing a headscarf runs contrary to the furtherance of values of pluralism, respect for the rights of others, and
equality before the law for men and women.
Further, the Court held that it must take
into account the particular political, social,
and historical situation in Turkey in order to
evaluate the legitimacy of the regulation
banning the wearing of Islamic headscarves
in educational institutions. The Court identified issues at stake such as the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others and the
maintenance of public order. Because the
religious symbol of the Islamic headscarf has
taken on political significance in Turkey in
recent years, the Court reasoned that limitations on the freedom to wear religious
insignia can be seen as meeting a pressing
social need to protect the principles of secularism and equality. In addition, the Court
reasoned that extremist political movements
present a danger in Turkey by “seek[ing] to
impose . . . their religious symbols and conception of a society founded on religious
precepts.” The Court found that this danger
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justified Turkey’s regulation as a measure
intended to preserve pluralism in the
University. Finally, the Court stated that the
manner in which the University applied its
measures was not discriminatory, because it
treated all forms of dress that symbolize or
manifest a religion or faith the same by barring them from the University premises.
Based on the arguments presented
above, the Court concluded that the
University of Istanbul’s regulations imposing restrictions on the wearing of Islamic
headscarves, as well as the implementing
measures, were justified in principle and
proportionate to the aims pursued. As a
result, the regulations were “necessary in a
democratic society” and not in breach of
Article 9 of the European Convention. The
Court also found the regulations did not
violate Articles 8, 10, and 14 of the
European Convention, or Article 2 of
Protocol No. 1, because the relevant circumstances were the same as those it examined in relation to Article 9.
The Court’s rejection of an appeal by a
Turkish student who was barred from
attending Istanbul University medical school
because her headscarf violated the official
dress code could be a precedent-setting decision. The Court held that principles of secularism and equality justified the imposition
of the ban and did not require the state to
show evidence that wearing a headscarf in a
state university could, in practice, undermine a public policy intended to protect the
well being and rights of citizens. Further, the
Court supported the justification that the
regulation protects the rights and freedoms
of others who do not choose to wear the
headscarf. In its report on the issue of the
headscarf ban in Turkey, Human Rights
Watch warned that, because the Court’s
decision takes precedence over national
court rulings, it could help the French government defend its case for the headscarf
ban it imposed in high schools. Considering
the trend toward restrictions on this type of
religious expression in some European
countries, its disproportionate and discriminatory effect on Islamic women, as well as
the rise of anti-Islamic sentiment and xenophobia, Human Rights Watch reported that
the Court’s decision does not seem to contribute to the amelioration of the situation
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or to protection of the principles of tolerance and pluralism in Europe.

INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS

THE
system was created with the adoption of the
American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man (Declaration) in 1948. In
1959, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (Commission) was established
as an independent organ of the Organization
of the American States (OAS) and held its first
session one year later. In 1969, the American
Convention on Human Rights (Convention)
was adopted. The Convention further defined
the role of the Commission and created the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(Court). According to the Convention, once
the Commission determines a case is admissible and meritorious, it will make recommendations and, in some cases, present the case to the
Court for adjudication. The Court hears these
cases, determines responsibility under relevant
regional treaties and agreements, and assesses
and awards damages and other forms of reparation to victims of human rights violations.
The Court recently issued its first two
opinions addressing issues of free speech. In
both cases, the Court found for the complainants, who had been punished in their
respective countries for defamation of character in the course of public dialogue. In
Canese v. Paraguay and Herrera Ulloa v. Costa
Rica, the Court found that the States violated Article 13 of the Convention, which protects freedom of thought and expression.
Although the Convention allows states
to place limitations on the freedom of
thought and expression in certain circumstances, the Court did not find that the facts
presented in these cases warranted any such
limitation. The Court determined that the
criminal sanctions imposed by the State in
each of these cases would act as a deterrent
to free expression, leading to self-censorship
and, ultimately, direct censorship. The
Court decided to rule on these two cases to
protect and promote the free expression of
journalists and the general public, whose
expression serves the public good.

CANESE V. PARAGUAY
The plaintiff in Canese v. Paraguay was
a presidential candidate in Paraguay’s first

democratic election in 1993, which took
place after 35 years of dictatorial rule. Mr.
Canese, who had been a national expert on
energy issues for many years, was exiled
from his country for seven years, returned at
the fall of the dictatorship, and subsequently became a presidential candidate. During
his presidential campaign, he spoke out
against his opponent for financially benefiting from an improper relationship with the
former dictator of Paraguay. After years of
research, Mr. Canese believed his opponent,
the director of a hydroelectric company,
received tax exemptions from the former
dictator to enhance his own financial standing and that of his company. Mr. Canese
made these allegations on news programs
broadcast over the radio and on television.
A trial court found Mr. Canese guilty of
defamation and ordered him to pay a fine
and serve time in prison. Throughout his
judicial proceedings, Mr. Canese was prohibited from leaving the country.
More than eight years later, the
Paraguayan Supreme Court finally acquitted
Mr. Canese. Although the Supreme Court
eventually removed the penal sanctions
against him, the Inter-American Court was
concerned about the long-term consequences of his sentence, namely that it
would silence other journalists who sought
to denounce corruption in Paraguay.
The Court found that Article 13 only
allows limitations on freedom of speech in
exceptional circumstances of public interest,
such as national security. In cases of public
elections, however, the Court found that the
public’s interest in making intelligent and
well-informed decisions outweighs the private interests of a candidate who has voluntarily put himself in the public view.
The Government of Paraguay argued
that Article 11 of the Convention allows a
government to make laws protecting the
right to privacy, honor, and dignity of a person. Recent decisions by the European
Court of Human Rights and the African
Commission, as well as other international
jurisprudence, however, bolstered the
Court’s decision that restrictions on speech
should be minimal. Accordingly, the Court
found that governments should attempt to
strike a balance between protecting individual privacy and honor, while safeguarding
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the public right to information. Democracy,
the Court determined, is only possible when
public scrutiny holds officials accountable;
therefore, governments must be more tolerant of statements made during a political
debate or in a context in which the subject
of the comments voluntarily puts him or
herself in the public eye.

HERRERA ULLOA V. COSTA RICA
In Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, the
Court again found a violation of Article 13’s
guarantee of freedom of thought and expression. Mr. Ulloa, a journalist for a national
publication, published several articles on the
illicit actions of Costa Rica’s honorary representative to the International Organization
of Atomic Energy during a national debate
regarding foreign relations. A Costa Rican
court imposed civil and criminal sanctions
on Mr. Ulloa, ordering him to pay a fine,
register on a national judicial delinquent list,
and remove the articles from the internet. As
a result of these sanctions, Mr. Ulloa also
lost his job.
The Court determined that the State
had violated Article 13 of the Convention
by sanctioning Mr. Ulloa, finding that a
substantial national interest in a free press
outweighed the representative’s right to
privacy. Article 13 only allows for restrictions on speech that are specifically enumerated in the country’s domestic law and
exist for the purposes of protecting the
rights or reputations of others, protecting
national security, or protecting the public
order. The Court found that none of those
requirements were satisfied.
Canese and Herrera Ulloa were the first
decisions by the Court to address freedom of
speech. Through these cases, the Court recognized that protecting free speech is an
essential step to ensuring true democracy in
Latin America. These decisions also demonstrate the Court’s willingness to expand the
range of issues it will address in the future
beyond extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances.

REQUESTS FOR ADVISORY OPINIONS
Currently, two requests for advisory
opinions are pending before the Court. An
advisory opinion is a non-binding opinion that
reflects the Court’s position on a particular
continued on back cover
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issue, but does not relate to a specific case.
Prior to issuing an advisory opinion, the Court
accepts amicus briefs from interested parties
anywhere in the world.
In April 2004, the Commission filed a
request for an advisory opinion with the
Court. The Commission asked the Court to
define the manner in which the jurisprudence of the Inter-American human rights
system can restrict or place requirements on
domestic legislation regarding capital punishment. The Commission asked if the guarantees of the Convention and the Declaration
are compatible with legislative measures that
would: 1) deny persons sentenced to death
access to judicial or other effective recourse
to challenge the mandatory sanction
imposed, 2) deny persons sentenced to death
access to judicial or other effective recourse
to challenge the sanction imposed based
upon the delay or conditions under which
the person has been detained, and 3) deny

persons sentenced to death access to judicial
or other effective recourse to challenge the
sanction imposed on the basis that they have
a complaint pending before the InterAmerican human rights system.
The Commission believes these restrictions would be incompatible because the
Convention is a source of international obligation for OAS member states. The
Commission asked the Court to interpret
the Convention and the Declaration in relation to legislative measures taken by States
Parties to determine whether they may proscribe legislation that is incompatible with
international obligations.
In November 2003, Venezuela asked the
Court to issue an advisory opinion to determine whether an organ exists within the
Inter-American human rights system to
oversee the actions of the Commission and
provide a forum in which States Parties to
the Convention could question the legality
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of the Commission’s actions. Venezuela
then requested that the Court identify that
body, if it exists, and describe the scope of
its functions and powers. Venezuela is concerned that if the Commission violates its
own legal statutes it could jeopardize the
rights of States, as well as call into question
the correct application of the Convention
and other applicable international legal
instruments.
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